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Summary findings
Laeven uses panel data on 394 firms in 13 developing  Laeven hypothesizes that financial liberalization has
countries for the years 1988-98  to learn whether  little effect on the financing constraints of large firms
financial liberalization relaxes financing constraints on  because they have better access  to preferential directed
firms. He finds that liberalization affects small and large  credit in the period before liberalization.
firms differently.  Financial liberalization also reduces imperfections in
Small firms are financially constrained before  financial markets, especially the asymmetric information
liberalization begins but become less so after  costs of firms' financial leverage.
liberalization. The financing constraints on large firms,  Countries that liberalize their financial sectors tend to
however, are low both before and after liberalization.  see dramatic improvements in political climate as well.
The initial difference between small and large firms  Successful  financial liberalization seems to require both
disappears over time.  the political will and the ability to stop the preferential
treatment of well-connected, usually large, firms.
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In this study we explore the impact of financial reforms on financial constraints of firms
in  developing  countries.  These  reforms  have  consisted  mainly  of  the  removal  of
administrative controls on interest rates and the scaling down of directed credit programs.
Barriers to  entry  in  the  banking  sector have  often  been  lowered  as  well  and  the
development of  securities  markets was  stimulated.  Altfiough the  main  objective  of
financial deregulation  should be  to  increase the  supply of  funds for investment, the
consequence  of  financial  liberalization  on  the  supply  of  funds  for  investment  is
theoretically ambiguous. In a repressed financial system, govemments often intervene by
keeping interest rates artificially low and replace market with administrative allocation of
funds.  Interest rate  liberalization is  likely  to  lead  to  an  increase  in  interest  rates.
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argue that low interest rates on deposits discourage
household savings, and thus favor interest rate liberalization. They also argue that interest
rate ceilings distort the allocation of credit and may lead to under-investment in projects
that are risky, but have a high expected rate of return. The neo-structuralists (see Van
Wijnbergen (1982,  1983a,  1983b, 1985)) argue that  the existence of  informal  credit
markets can reverse the effect of an increase in interest rates on the total  amount of
savings. The effect of an increase in the deposit rate on the amount of loanable funds
depends on whether households substitute out of curb market loans or out of cash to
increase their holdings  of time deposits. If time deposits are closer substitutes for curb
market loans than for cash, then the supply of funds to firms will fall, given that banks
are subject to reserve  requirements and  curb markets  are not.  Both  theories have in
common that financial liberalization changes the composition of savings and will not
necessarily relax financial constraints for all classes of firms.
Some  authors  claim  that  in  a  number  of  developing  countries  financial
liberalization has failed to meet expected efficiency gains, because accompanying the rise
in loan rates was a rise in the required extemal finance premium for a substantial class of
borrowers 2, and others say that financial liberalization has led to crises. However, to the
extent that there are economies of scale in information gathering and monitoring it is
expected that banks have an advantage over the curb or informal market in allocating
2investment funds, and this should lead to an increase in the access of external finance and
a reduction in the "premium" of extemal finance over internal finance. At the same time,
the elimination of subsidized credit programs could increase the financing constraints on
those firms that previously benefited  from the directed credit system.
Evidence about the effects of financial liberalization on financing constraints in
developing countries has been provided by Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994) for
Indonesia, Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1997) for Ecuador, Gelos and  Werner
(1999) for Mexico, and Gallego and Loayza (2000) for Chile. For Indonesia, Harris,
Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994) find evidence that the sensitivity to cash flow decreases
for small firms after financial liberalization and that borrowing costs have increased,
while for Ecuador, Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1997) find no  evidence of a
change in borrowing constraints after financial reform. This may be the result of the fact
that in Ecuador financial liberalization was less profound than in Indonesia, or benefited
only certain firms. The findings may also be the result of using relatively short panels,
while the effects of liberalization are only felt over a  long period of time.  Gelos and
Werner (1999) examine the impact of financial liberalization on financing constraints in
Mexico and find that financial constraints were eased for small firms but not for large
ones. They argue that large firms might have had stronger political connections than
small firms  and  hence  better  access to  preferential directed credit  before  financial
deregulation. Gallego and Loayza (2000) examine the impact of financial liberalization
on financing constraints in Chile and find that financial constraints were eased during the
period of liberalization in the following sense: firm investment became more responsive
to changes in Tobin's q, less tied to internal cash flow, and less affected by the debt-to-
capital ratio.
From the above it is clear that there can be distributional consequences to programs
of financial liberalization, and whether they relax financing constraints  for different
categories of firms is ultimately an empirical question. This paper aims to address this
question, We contribute to the literature by using panel data for a large number of firms
in  13 developing countries to analyze the  effects of  financial liberalization on  firm
investment and financing constraints, rather than focusing on one single country.
2 See Gertler  and Rose  (1994).
3Closely  related  to  our  paper  is  the  work  by  Love  (2000)  who  studies  the
relationship between financial development and financing constraints by estimating Euler
equations on  a firm  level  for a  sample of 40  countries. Love (2000) finds a  strong
negative relationship between the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal
funds and an indicator of  financial market development, and  concludes that financial
development reduces  the  effect  of  financing  constraints on  investment. This  result
provides evidence for the hypothesis that financial development reduces informational
asymmetries in financial markets which leads to  an improvement in the allocation of
capital and ultimately to a higher level of growth.
Section 2 reviews  the literature on financing constraints. Section 3 presents the
structural model of  firm  investment that we  use to  estimate the  impact of  financial
liberalization on  financing  constraints of  firms.  Section 4  describes the  econometric
techniques we employ to  estimate our structural model of firm investment. Section 5
presents the firm-level data used in our empirical work. Section 6 presents the results of
our empirical work. Section 7 assesses the robustness of our results. Section 8 concludes.
2  Literature Review
Following the work of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) a large body of literature
has emerged to provide evidence of such financing constraints. This literature relies on
the  assumption that  external  finance  is  more  costly  than  internal  finance  due  to
asymmetric information and  agency problems,  and  that  the  "premium"  on  external
finance is an inverse function of a borrower's net worth. It has been found that financial
variables such as cash  flow are important explanatory variables for investment. These
findings are usually attributed to capital market imperfections as described above (see the
surveys by Schiantarelli (1995), Blundell, Bond and Meghir (1996) and Hubbard (1998)).
Following Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) it is usually assumed that there are
cross-sectional differences in effects of internal funds on firms'  investment, so that the
investment equation should hold across adjacent periods for a priori unconstrained firms
but be violated for constrained firms. This has led to different a priori classifications of
firms that have tried to  distinguish financially constrained and not-constrained firms.
From  a  theoretical point  of  view  such  sorting  criteria  should  focus  on  a  firm's
4charactenrstics  that are associated with  information costs. A number of studies have
grouped firms by dividend payouts 3; other a priori  groupings of firms have focused on
group affiliation 4, size and age 5, the presence of bond ratings 6, the degree of shareholder
concentration, or  the  pattern  of  insider trading 7. The problems with  such  a  priori
classifications is that they are usually assumed to be fixed over the entire sample period,
and that  the criteria used to split the sample are likely to be correlated with both the
individual  and  time-invariant  component  of  the  error  term,  as  well  as  with  the
idiosyncratic component,  which  creates  an  endogeneity problem  (see  Schiantarelli
(1995)). In addition, Lamont (1997) has shown that the finance costs of different parts of
the same corporation can be  interdependent, in  such a way that a  firmn  subsidiary's
investment is significantly affected  by the cash flow of other subsidiaries  within the same
firm.
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) question the usefulness of a priori  groupings of firms.
They divide the firms studied by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) into categories of
"not  financially  constrained"  to  "financially  constrained"  based  upon  statements
contained in annual reports, and find no support for the presence of financing constraints.
The problem with their analysis is that it is difficult to make such classifications.  Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen  (1996) note that the  firn-years  Kaplan and  Zingales  (1997)
classify as most financially constrained are actually observations from years when firms
are financially  distressed.
Most studies on financing constraints since Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988)
estimate a q-model of investment, pioneered by Tobin (1969) and extended to models of
investment by Hayashi (1982). Financial variables such as cash flow are then added to
the q-model of investment to pick up capital market imperfections. If markets are perfect,
investment  should depend on marginal q only. Marginal q is usually measured by average
q (see Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Hayashi and Inoue (1991), and Blundell,
Bond, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1992)). Hayashi (1982) has shown that only under
3 See Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), and Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995).
4 See Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991).
5 See Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990).
6 See Whited (1992).
7 See Oliner and Rudebusch (1992).
5certain strong assumptions 8, marginal q equals average q. Also, using q as a measure for
investment opportunities may be  a poor proxy because of  a  breakdown  traceable to
efficient markets or capital market imperfections. For these reasons several researchers
have departed from the strategy of using proxies for marginal q and estimate the so-called
Euler equation describing the firm's  optimal capital stock directly (see Whited (1992),
Bond and Meghir (1994), Hubbard and Kashyap (1992), Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited
(1995)). The disadvantage of the Euler approach is that it relies on the period-by-period
restriction derived from the firm's first-order conditions.
An altemative approach bypasses using proxies for marginal q by forecasting the
expected present value of the current and future profits generated by an incremental unit
of fixed capital, as introduced by Abel and Blanchard (1986). Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1995,  1998) have  extended  this  approach by  using  a  vector  autoregression (VAR)
forecasting framework to decompose the effect of cash flow on investment.
Most studies of financing constraints focus on firms in one country. One of the few
cross-country studies is by Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay (1997), who study firms'
investment behavior in Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK, and find that financial
constraints on investment are more severe in the UK than in the three other countries.
Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay (1999) study firms' investment behavior in France and the US
and find significant changes in the investment behavior of French and US firms over the
last twenty years.
3  Methodology
In this section we present a model of investment with financial frictions that is similar to
models that have been explored in the literature. In particular, the model follows closely
Gilchrist  and  Himmelberg  (1998).  We  use  this  model  to  estimate  the  financing
constraints  of  firms.  The  model  allows  for  imperfect  capital  markets.  Under  the
Modigliani and Miller theorem (1958), that is if  capital markets are perfect,  a firm's
a  These  assumptions  are that the firm  is a price-taker  with constant  returns  to scale  in  both production  and
installation  (the production  function  and the installation  function  should  be homogeneous).  In addition,
models  of investment  based  on that  use  Tobin's  q or stock  market  valuation  as a proxy  for the expected
future  profitability  of invested  capital  require  additional  strong  assumptions  about  the efficiency  of capital
markets.
6capital structure is irrelevant to its value. In this case internal and external funds are
perfect substitutes and  firm investment decisions are independent from  its  financing
decisions. With imperfect capital markets, however, the costs of internal and external
finance will diverge due  to informational asymmetries 9,  costly monitoring  1,  contract
enforcement, and incentive problems' , so that internal and external funds generally will
not be perfect substitutes. Also, informational asymmetries lead to  a  link among net
worth, the cost of external financing, and investment. Within the neoclassical investment
model with  financial frictions, an  increase in  net worth independent of  changes in
investment opportunities leads to greater investment for firrns facing high information
costs and has no effect on investment for firms facing negligible information costs. It
follows that certain firns  are expected to face financing constraints, in particular firms
facing high information costs.
We assume that the  firm maximizes its present value,  which  is  equal to  the
expected  value of future dividends, subject to capital accumulation and external financing
constraints. Let  K,  be  the  firm's  capital  stock at  the beginning of  period  t,  *,  a
productivity shock to the firm's capital stock, and B, the firm's net financial liabilities.
Financial frictions are incorporated via the assumption that debt is the marginal source of
external finance, and that risk-neutral debt holders demand an external finance premium,
,  = l(K,,B,,  ,),  which  is  increasing in  the  amount borrowed,  aq  / aB >0,  due  to
agency costs. The idea is that highly leveraged firms have to pay an additional premium
to compensate debt holders for increased costs due to information asyrmmetry  problems.
We assume that the gross  required rate of return on debt is  (l+r )(l+)7(K,,B,,t,)),
where r, is the risk-free rate of return. The profit function is denoted by  Hl(K,,s,).  The
capital  stock  accumulation  depends  on  the  investment  expenditure  I,  and  the
depreciation rate  6. The convex adjustment cost function of installing I, units of capital
is given by C(I,, K,).  Dividend paid out to shareholders  is denoted by D,.
9 Myers and Majluf (1984)  present the informational asymmetry problems of equity financing, and Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) show that inforrnational  asynmnetries  may cause credit rationing in the loans market.
'0 See Townsend (1979) for a model of costly state verification.
" Jensen  and  Meckling  (1976)  show  that  in the presence  of limited-liability  debt  the firm  may  have  the
incentive  to opt for excessively risky investment projects that are value destroying.
7For debt rather than equity to be the firm's  marginal source of finance, we need
either to assume a binding non-negativity constraints on dividends, or to assume that
equity holders prefer to  have dividends paid out rather than  re-invested. We follow
Gilchrist  and Himmelberg  (1998)'s  implementation by  introducing  a  non-negativity
constraint on dividends, which implies that there is a shadow cost associated with raising
new equity due to information asymmetry.'2 For simplicity we ignore taxes. Then the
manager's problem is
V(K,,B 1,,{)=  max2  D, +  E{  i,+SD,+]  (1) V(K  B,4/)  max  s+z}  It  51,#+D
subject to
D, =  fI(K,,  )-C(I,,Kt)  -I,  +  Bt+,  - ( 1 + r,)(I  + i(B,, K,  t))Bt,  (2)
Kt+l = (I -. 5)K,  +  I,,  (3)
D,2>0,  (4)
where  EJ[.] is  the  expectations  operator  conditional  on  time  t  information,  and
P  =  (1=  + r,+k  )-'  is the s-period discount factor, which discounts period t + s to t.
k=1
Let A, be the Lagrange multiplier for the non-negativity constraint on dividends.
This multiplier can be interpreted as the shadow cost of internal funds. Then the Euler
equation for investment is'3
12 Another  way  to introduce  financial  frictions  is by limniting  the amount  of debt that  the firm  can raise  at
any point  in  time  as in Whited  (1992),  Hubbard,  Kashyap  and  Whited  (1995),  and Jaramnillo,  Schiantarelli
and Weiss  (1996).
13 Note  that (5D  / AK),+,  = (an /  K)  ,+ - (8C  / aK),+I  .For simnplicity,  we ignore  the derivative  of the
adjustment  cost function  with  respect  to the capital  stock, (OC  / 8K),+ 1 , because  it is a small  (second
order)  effect  relative  to (8al  / aK),+,  equal  to the difference  in I/  K  ratios at time  t + I and t.
8ar,  I (  I+A,  K)IA  as  JJ
The first-order  condition for debt requires that
I,[  +  AW  'q+7t++'3  Bt,+  j=1  (6)
Since the first-order condition for debt does not relate in any specific way to the Euler
investment equation, we can focus on the investment decision and make the choice of
debt implicit.
Let  MPK,  denote the marginal profit function. For simplicity, assume the one-
period discount rate  P,+, is constant over time and across firms. Then the first-order
condition for investment can be written as
1+ aC(al'K~)  t)=E[  (l_i)5C1+2  t+  )k  MPK,+5]  (7)
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) use  a first-order Taylor approximation around the
means to linearize the term with Lagrange  multipliers to get
1+  aCI,,K,)  =c±E,[Zfis(l  i6)sMPKt+11+MEt[  ZZ/s(1-6)3FINt+*]  (8)
where FIN, is a financial variable that affects the shadow discount termr  A,+] 1+2,
We follow the tradition in the literature since Summers (1981) and Hayashi (1982)
by specifying an adjustment cost function that is linearly homogeneous in investment and
capital, so that average q  equals marginal q. An example of such a  specification as
9proposed by Summers (1981) would be  C(QI,K,)=  V)  K,.  Instead, we follow
Love (2000) and specify C(I,,K,)=-  y  - v  K,  as adjustment cost function.
This specification includes lagged investment to capital to capture strong persistence in
investment to capital ratios. In a perfect world, current investment should not depend on
lagged investment. However, in reality there may be a link between current and lagged
investment since firms often times make arrangements that are costly to cancel. Under
this specification of the adjustment cost technology, the relationship between investment,
the present value of future FIN,  and the present value of future MPK,  is given by'4
I,  __-  1  .0. 
-=c+gg-I  +-E 1 IL  (1-b)EMPK+I  +  _0Et  ,  (1-)  FINt+k (9)
The standard q model of investment is a special case of the above model where  0 = 0,
and the model is typically estimated using Tobin's q as a proxy for the present value of
future marginal profits.
We assume that  MPK,  and  FINt  follow a vector autoregressive (VAR) process.
Rather than using a large number of variables to forecast the future marginal profitability
of investment as in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), we use current values of  MPK,
and FIN,  only. Let the variable xi, be a vector containing current values of MPK,  and
FIN,.  We assume  that  this vector follows  an  autoregressive progress  of  order one,
xit+ =  Axi, + Uit+i,  where i indicates firm i = {  1,...,n}.  If we assume that E(ui,+l  IXi,)  = 0,
then by recursive substitution it follows that E(xi,+, I  xi,) = Asxi, . The expected present
value of marginal profits MPKi,  at time t for firm i is then given by
14 Here,  we  use  that (CCI  Ua),  = a-  I'  - g  --  v) .
10PVj,MP'  = Ej,  E6 5(I  - )5MPKit+s
s=I
= 4I  E  s (1-  )S  Asx 1 (10)
s=1
= i (I  - /(1 - 9)A)-'  /(1 -,)Axj,,
where l; = (1  0)  and  I  is the identity matrix. Similarly, the expected present value of
financial factors  FINi, is given by
0  s
P ViFlv  = Ej,  E  E,8  (I  (-  9)5 FlNj,+s
s=1  k=1
w  s
=  ,'IEis(1I-)!A'xi,  (11)
s=1  k=l
=  z (1  - /(1 - ))-' (I - #(1 - 9)A)-' ,/(1 -,)Axi,,
where  i'  =  (0  1). Since these present value expressions are linear combinations of the
underlying variables  MPK1 ,  and  FINjl,  we  can  specify a  reduced-form  model  of
investment  that is linear in MPK,, and FIN7,
it  = c + a,  it- + /32MPKil + /33FIN,  + f,  + d, + s,  (12)
Kit  Kit l
where /  and d, are fixed and year effects, and e,, is an error term.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998)
show that the marginal profitability of fixed capital equals the ratio of sales to capital (up
to a scale parameter). We therefore take the ratio of net sales to capital  as a proxy for
MPKi,. For listed firrns we proxy MPKJ, by Tobin's q as well. We proxy the financial
11factors  FINj, by the cashflow-to-capital ratio  -.  The problem with the cash flow
Kit
measure is that it might be a good proxy for future investment opportunities as well.
In the face of imperfect financial markets, the degree of leverage of the firm may
deter the availability of external financing even after controlling for Tobin's q. The basic
model of investment we estimate is thus as follows:
i.t = c+  ,it-I  +  / 2MPK 1, + / 3FINi, + 3 4LE  Vi +f,  +dt +ei  (13)
Kit  Kit-,
where LEVj, is the leverage of the firm, which we measure by the ratio of long-term
debt-to-capital  i',
Kit
We have mentioned before that, in the absence of financial restrictions and agency
problems, firm investment depends exclusively on the marginal profitability of capital
(MPK). However, to the extent that the firm faces constraints on external financing, its
investment will be determined in part by its internal resources (FIN). Furthermore, in the
face of imperfect financial markets, the degree of leverage of the firm (LEV) may deter
the availability of extemal financing. Therefore, we consider that a firm faces a better
functioning financial system when, first, its investment is more responsive to changes in
MPK;  second, investment  is  less  determined by  the  internal  resources;  and,  third,
investment is less negatively affected by the firm's leverage.
As in Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994), Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss
(1996) and Gelos and Werner (1999) we test whether small firms are more financially
constrained than large firms. In addition, we test whether both small and large firms have
become less financially constrained during the process of financial liberalization. Large
firms are likely to be less financially constrained than small firms, because lenders are
likely to have more information about large firms. Those borrowers also are likely to
have relatively more collateralizable wealth. Another reason why large firms may have
less informational problems  is that they often belong to  industrial groups with bank
associations. Size considerations may also affect the access to directed credit programs at
12subsidized rates, because such programs often favor exporting finns, which are often
large firms, and because large firms often have stronger political connections.
4  Estimation Techniques
Dynamic investment models are likely to suffer from both endogeneity and heterogeneity
problems. In a standard q model of investment  the error term is a technology shock to the
profit function.  q  is  a  function of the technology shock and hence  is endogenous.
Hayashi and Inoue (1991) argue that a wide range of variables pertaining to the firm such
as output and cash flow also depend on the technology shock, and are thus endogenous as
well.  When estimating  a  structural investment model,  substantial differences across
individuals in their investment behavior may lead to a heterogeneity problem reflected by
the presence of unobserved individual effects. Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (1997) argue that
pooling  data,  using  appropriate  estimation  techniques,  and  grouping  individuals
according  to certain a priori  criteria can help overcome this heterogeneity problem.
In  this  section  we  describe  the  Generalized  Methods  of  Moments  (GMM)
estimators for dynamic panel data models as introduced by Hansen (1982), Holtz-Eakin,
Newey and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995),
which we use to estimate the structural model of firm investment in the previous section.
These estimators allow to  control for unobserved individual effects, endogeneity of
explanatory  variables, and the use of lagged dependent variables. Consider the following
model
Yi=  ayi,_1  + 8'x,,  + y'fi  + u,,,  (14)
where
Ui=  7j + vi,  (15)
and
E(vI, I  Xio, .,  ,xir,1  = 0  (16)
13where fi is an observed individual effect and  '1, is an unobserved individual effect. In
this  model, regardless of  the existence of  unobserved individual effects, unrestricted
serial correlation in vi, implies that y,-,  is an endogenous variable.
In estimating the investment model (13) we want to allow for the possibility of
simultaneous determination and reverse causality of the explanatory variables and the
dependent variable. We therefore relax the assumption that all explanatory variables are
strictly exogenous'5 and  assume weak exogeneity of the explanatory variables in the
sense that they are assumed to be uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term.'6
The joint  endogeneity of the explanatory variables  calls for an  instrumental variable
procedure to obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients of interest.
For the moment we assume that unobserved individual effects are not present. In
that  case we  can apply a  GMM estimator to  equation (14) in  levels. This  estimator
overcomes the potential problem of endogeneity of the explanatory variables and the use
of  lagged dependent variables. Under the assumption that the error term  vi,  is serially
uncorrelated or, a least, follows a moving average process of finite order, and that future
innovations of the dependent variable do not affect  current values of the  explanatory
variables, the following observations can be  used as valid  instruments in  the GMM
estimation:  (Y 1-2  Yi.-3,.  ,y 1,)  and  (Xi,  2'Xi,  ,...,  xi,).  We  call  this  the  GMM  level
estimator.
In the presence of unobserved individual effects the GMM level estimator produces
inconsistent estimates. An indication that unobserved individual effects are present is a
persistent serial correlation of the residuals. To solve the estimation problem raised by the
potential presence of unobserved individual effects one can estimate the specific model in
first-differences. If  we remove  the unobserved individual effect by  first-differencing
equation (14) we obtain
Ayi,  =  aAy;,1 +  f'Ax;,  +  Avi,  (17)
15  An explanatory  variable  is strictly  exogenous  if it is uncorrelated  with  the error term at all leads  and lags.
16 In the setting of the investment model in (13) the assumption of weak exogeneity of the explanatory
variables means that current explanatory variables may be affected by past and current investment-to-
capital ratios, but not by future ones.
14The use  of  instruments is  again  required because  Av,,  is  correlated  with  Ay,,,  by
construction, and joint  endogeneity of the explanatory variables might still be present.
Under  the  assumptions  that  the  error  term  v,  is  not  serially  correlated  and  the
explanatory variables are weakly exogenous, the following moment conditions apply to
the lagged dependent variable and the set of explanatory variables:
E(yi,,  Av,) = O  Vs > 2;t = 3,...,T  (18)
E(xa  -Av,)  = °  Vs 2 2;  t = 3,..., T,  (I19)
so that (Yi,-2,Y,.-3, .Yil)  and (xit-2 ,xi, 3,...,xil) are valid instruments. We refer to this
estimator as the difference estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991) have shown that under
the above assumptions the difference estimator is an efficient GMM estimator for the
above model. Although  the difference estimator solves the problem  of  the potential
presence  of  unobserved  individual  effects,  the  estimator  has  some  statistical
shortcomings. Blundell and Bond (1997) show that when the dependent variable and the
explanatory variables are persistent over time, lagged levels of these variables are weak
instruments for the regression equation in differences.
Blundell and  Bond  (1997)  suggest  the  use of Arellano  and  Bover's  (1995) system
estimator to overcome the statistical problems associated with the difference estimator.
Arellano and Bover's  (1995) show that, when there are instruments available that are
uncorrelated with the individual effects i7i, these variables can be used as instruments for
the equations in levels. They develop an efficient GMM estimator for the combined set of
moment restrictions relating to the equations in first differences and to the equations in
levels.  This  so-called  system  estimator  makes  the  additional  assumption  that  the
differences of  the  right-hand  side  variables  are not  correlated  with  the unobserved
individual effects' 7
E(yi,qf)  = E(yi., 1 q)  Vt,s,  (20)
17 Note  that there  may  be correlation  between  the levels  of the right-hand  side  variables  and the unobserved
individual effects.
15E(x,,qi) =  E(xis,qi)  Vt,s,  (21)
These assumptions may be justified on the grounds of stationarity. Arellano and Bover
(1995) show  that  combining  equations (18)-(19) and  (20)-(21) gives  the  following
additional moment restrictions 8
E(ui,  Ayi,,  ) = 0  (22)
E(ui,Axi,  -) = 0  (23)
Thus, valid instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of the
corresponding  variables.1 9 Hence,  we use  (yi,-2, yj, 3 ,...  ,  yi  )  and ( xi,t2 i Xit.3  xil  )  as
instruments for the equations in first differences, and  y  with Ax1,,  as instruments for
the equations in levels. Again, these are appropriate instruments only under the above
assumption of no correlation between the right-hand side variables and the unobserved
individual effect.
To assess the validity of the assumptions on which the three different estimators are
based we consider four specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). The
first  is  a  Sargan test of  over-identifying restrictions, which tests  the validity of the
instruments. The second is a test of second-order serial correlation of the error term,
which tests whether the error term in the differenced model follows a first-order moving
average process 2 0. The third is the so-called Difference Sargan test, which tests  the
validity of the extra instruments used in the levels equations of the system estimator. And
the fourth is a Hausman specification test, which is another test for the validity of the
additional instruments used in the levels equations of the system estimator.
The Difference Sargan test statistic compares the Sargan statistic for the system
estimator and the Sargan statistic for the corresponding first-differenced estimator. The
difference Sargan  test  statistic is  asymptotically distributed  as  X  2  under  the  null
"Moment restrictions  based  on other  lagged  differences  are  redundant  (see  Arellano  and  Bover,  1995).
9 The instruments  for the regression  in differences  are the same  as before,  that is,  the lagged  levels  of the
corresponding  variables.
20 The use  of endogenous  variables  dated  t - 2 as instruments  is only  valid  if Vi, is serially  uncorrelated,
implying  a first-order  moving  average  error  term  in the differenced  model.
16hypothesis of validity of the  instruments. The number of degrees of  freedom of the
difference Sargan test statistic is given by the number of additional restrictions in the
system estimator, which equals the difference between the nunber of degrees of freedom
of the system estimator and that of the difference estimator.
The Hausman statistics tests the difference between the coefficients of the GMM
system estimates and the corresponding GMM first-differenced estimates, that is the
estimates without the additional levels equations. The Hausman test statistic is a Wald
test of the hypothesis that the distance between the coefficients is zero, and the degrees of
freedom is given by the number of additional level equations.
We also introduce multiplicative  dummies to assess differences across firms along
certain criteria. If we define 4,,  to be a firm-specific dummy variable, then introducing
this variable as a multiplicative dummy changes equation (14) as follows
yi.  = ayi-l  +  'Xi, +  Ai4,Xi, + Y'fi  +u  1 ,,  (14')
If the multiplicative dummy is an exogenous variable and xt, 2 is a valid instrument for
the endogenous variable xi,, then 4,ixit 2 is a valid instrument for A,txi,  .In estimating the
investment model  in  equation  (13)  we  treat  the  weakly  exogenous  variables  as
endogenous variables and potential multiplicative dummies as exogenous variables. If we
interact the weakly exogenous variables with the multiplicative dummies we use  the
aforementioned  appropriate transformations  of these interacted variables as instruments.
5  Data
To explore the impact of financial reforms on financial constraints of firms we need a
measure of financial liberalization and firn-level data. We construct an index of domestic
financial liberalization of the banking sector based upon country reports from various
sources. The problem of constructing such an index is that financial liberalization often
takes place in various ways.
We construct the financial liberalization variable as follows. We collect data on the
implementation of reform packages related to six different measures. The liberalization
17variable is simply the sum of six dummy variables that are each associated with one of
the six reform measures. The dummy variables take value one in the years characterized
by the liberalized regime. Hence, our index of  financial liberalization can take values
between 0 and 6. The index is not strictly comparable across countries in absolute terms
For example, there is likely to be a significant difference in the initial stage of financial
liberalization among the countries in our sample. However, since increases in our index
of financial liberalization capture progress in financial liberalization within a country, the
index is comparable across countries in relative terms. The six reform measures we focus
on are: interest rates deregulation (both  lending and deposit rates), reduction of entry
barriers  (both  for  domestic  and  foreign  banks),  reduction  of  reserve  requirements,
reduction of credit controls (such as directed credit, credit ceilings), privatization of state
banks  (and  more  generally  reduction  of  government control),  and  strengthening of
prudential regulation (such as independence of the Central Bank or adoption of capital
adequacy ratio standards  according to  the  Basle Accord guidelines).  These measures
correspond  to  the  domestic  financial  liberalization  measures  in  Bandiera,  Caprio,
Honohan and Schiantarelli (2000), who use principal components to construct an index of
financial liberalization for eight developing countries.
Table 1 indicates the years in which significant progress been made with respect to
one of these six measures. Annex 1 describes in more detail what types of progress have
been made in these years with respect to one of these six measures. Table 2 presents the
financial liberalization index (FLI) for a number of countries.
A number of clear patterns arise from the financial liberalization index. First of all,
all developing countries in our sample have made substantial progress in liberalization of
their banking sectors. A number of countries had repressed financial systems in the 80s,
but could be considered liberalized in 1996. Secondly, the index suggests that countries
liberalize their financial systems gradually and in stages. In most countries, interest rates
are liberalized and reserve requirements are reduced in the first stage of liberalization. In
a second stage entry barriers are removed and directed credit systems (and other forms of
credit control) are eliminated. Only in the final stage are state banks privatized and is
prudential regulation put into place. This sequence of financial liberalization is presented
in Table 3 in more detail.
18Williamson  and  Mahar  (1998)  have  found  a  similar  progress  in  financial
liberalization for these countries. In fact, if we define a countries financial system to be
largely liberalized in the year when significant progress has been made with respect to
five of our six measures of financial liberalization, that is when FLI takes value 5, we
find  a  similarity with  the  years in  which  Williamson and Mahar  (1998)  consider a
country's financial system to be largely liberalized. Table 4 presents this comparison.
The period under consideration has not only been characterized by liberalization of
the banking sectors. Developing countries have implemented many different types of
reform programs during  this period under changing political  climates. In  addition to
liberalization of the banking sector, one key  component of financial  reform in  most
developing countries has been liberalizing of the stock market. Table 4 shows the dates
on which IFC considers the stock markets of these countries to be open to foreigners. The
table suggests that stock market liberalization has preceded liberalization of the banking
sector in most countries, Chile being the only exception.
Furthermore, progress in financial liberalization seems to  be  strongly correlated
with improvements in the political climate of a country. If we use the ICRG political risk
index as a measure of political risk, we find a correlation as high as 66% between the
political risk  rating  and  our  financial liberalization index  (see  Table  5). The ICRG
political risk index is constructed by Political Risk Service, ranges between 0 and 100%,
and is decreasing in the level of political risk. The result suggests that political stability is
a pre-requisite for financial liberalization.
We  collect  firm-level  panel  data  from  World  Scope  on  firms  in  developing
countries for the years 1988-98. Using panel data has certain advantages. First, it allows
to  differentiate across  firms. As  explained before, it  is  likely  that  firms  are treated
differently in  a  regime  of  financial repression  (for  example,  due  to  directed credit
programs). It is also likely that the effects of liberalization differ across firms according
to their size and other factors. This is so because, as explained by Schiantarelli, Atiyas,
Caprio and Weiss (1994), the alternative to a financially repressed system is not a perfect
capital market, but a market for funds characterized by informational asymmetries and
less than complete contract enforceability, giving rise to agency problems, whose severity
varies for different types of firms. Second, the availability of panel data allows to identify
19more precisely the effects of financial liberalization over time, which is attractive since
financial reform is often a process over a longer period.
We focus on listed firms, since most firms in the World Scope sample are listed,
and because the quality of the accounting data is expected to be higher for listed firms.
Focusing  on  listed  firms  has  the  additional  advantage  that  we  can  compare  the
performance of the two different measures of marginal profitability of capital, that is
Tobin's q versus the sales-to-capital ratio. For each company we need a certain minimum
coverage of the data to assess the changes in the financing structure of the firm. We set
this coverage to three years and therefore delete firms with less than three consecutive
years of observations. It is, however, necessary to delete more firms, because of outliers
in  the  data. Such  outliers  can be  explained by  revaluation  of  assets,  divestments,
acquisitions, or simply poor data. We impose a number of outlier rules. First of all, we
delete observations with negative fixed capital or investment. Such observations might be
due to divestments or revaluations of capital. Secondly, we restrict investment ratios from
taking high values. Such values might be due to acquisitions or revaluations of capital.
Furthermore, we restrict variables to take extreme values in terms of leverage, marginal
profitability or cash flow. We also delete firrns in  transition economies, because soft
budget constraints that have been inherited from the socialistic regime may distort the
analysis. Table 6 gives the details of the deletion criteria. After deleting firms according
to these criteria we have data on 394 listed firms in 13 countries. 21 Obviously, our sample
of firms is non-random. Listed firms, for example, tend to be large in most countries.
This non-randomness can be partly controlled for by allowing fixed effects.
For this set  of  firm-level data we  generate the necessary variables to  estimate
equation (13). We  assume  that flow variables  (such as  investment and  depreciation)
during period t are decided upon at the beginning of period t. Since accounting data only
provides end-of-period data, we use end-of-period t-1 figures to construct variables at the
beginning of period t.
To test for a difference in financing constraints between firms of different size, we
split our sample according to firm size. As measure of firm size we use net sales, reported
in US  dollars for comparability across countries. We construct  a small  size dummy,
20Small,, that takes value one if net sales is smaller than the sample median of net sales in
US, and zero otherwise. Similarly, we construct a large size dummy that indicates large
firms. Together with the financial liberalization indices (FLI) these size dummies are
used to  construct multiplicative dummies of  the weakly exogenous  variables. Such
dummies have been used before by Gallego and Loayza (2000) in a similar context. The
financial liberalization and size dummies are treated as exogenous variables in the levels
estimation. Table 7 gives a overview of the definition of variables used in the empirical
analysis.
Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics for all firms. We have data for the years
1988-98 on 394 firms. The average data coverage for each firm is 4.2 years, hence the
total number of observations is  1645. In comparing the descriptive statistics of small
versus large firms, we find that large firms invest more, have a lower q, have higher sales,
generate less cash flow, and borrow more (all in relative terms). None of these apparent
differences is, however, statistically significant. Table 8.e reports the correlation matrix
of the main variables. We find a high correlation between our measure of the importance
of financial factors, i.e. operating cash flow, and our measures of MPK, either q or the
sales-to-capital ratio. In the first case the correlation is 44%; in the second case even
61%. The correlation between q and the sales-to-capital ratio is 26%. Investment appears
to be mostly correlated with cash flow (correlation of 18%) and less so with q, or sales,
and  hardly  at  all  with  debt.  These  correlations suggest  that  firms  are  financially
constrained in the sense that investment responds mostly to cash flow instead of to q
only. However, since cash flow is highly correlated with both our measures of MPK, this
conclusion may be false. Econometric techniques are needed to determine the exact effect
of cash flow on investment.
Table 8.f presents the median of the variables by country. In our sample of firms,
we find significant differences in the size of firms across countries, where size is defined
by the level of sales. Firms in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Korea appear to be, while
firms in Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand are relatively smaller in our
sample. In our  empirical  analysis we  include country dummies to  correct  for such
differences among countries.
21 We  also  created  a larger  set  of firms  by applying  less  strict  outlier  rules.  This  set  includes  firms  from
Colombia,  Sri  Lanka,  Turkey  and  Venezuela.  Our  empirical  results  for  this  larger  set  of firms  are  simnilar  to
21Table 8.g presents the median of the variables by industry.  The industries are
defined according to  the  Standard Industry  Classification (SIC)  codes  of  the  U.S.
governmer.t. We group manufacturing companies in our  sample along two-digit SIC
codes and the remaining industries along one-digit SIC codes. More details on the SIC
codes can be found in Table 8.h. For our sample of firms, we find significant differences
in  the variables across the different industries. Some of these  differences are not  a
surprise. For example, cash flow is highest in the tobacco industry - not a surprise given
that the tobacco industry is in  general believed to be a cash  cow. Differences across
industries may, however, be partly due to the small sample size for some industries. In
our empirical analysis we include industry dummies to correct for such differences across
industries.
Table 8.i presents  the median of the variables by year.  In general, we  see no
dramatic changes in the variables over time. One exception is the level of investment in
1998, which is significantly lower than before. This can be explained by the fact that a
number of countries in our sample faced a financial crisis in  1998 which might have
reduced the number of investment opportunities for some firms. In our empirical analysis
we include year dummies to correct for such differences over time.
For our empirical work we need to  define when a  country has  liberalized its
financial  sector. In  deciding  upon  such  a  definition  we  take  the  following  into
consideration. Firstly,  we  have  noted earlier that countries have  followed a  certain
sequence  in  liberalizing  their  banking  sectors  with  some  important  measures  for
liberalization such  as  a  reduction  of  entry  barriers  and  improved  enforcement of
prudential regulation being implemented in a later stage. Secondly, we believe that a
combination  of  the  aforementioned  measures  is  necessary  for  effective  financial
liberalization. For  these reasons we  consider a  country liberalized if  it has taken  a
relatively large number of measures. In our empirical work, we consider several, related
definitions of financial liberalization. Our basic classification of financial liberalization
uses the level of the financial liberalization index (FLI) that splits our data set in two
equal sets to establish a cut-off rule. Table 8.j presents the distribution of FLI in terms of
observations. Let FLIS be a dummy variable that takes value one if the country has taken
5 measures, and zero otherwise. Table 8.j shows that 47% of observations have FL15=1,
the results we present here.
22while 53% of observations have FLI5=0. Our basic classification thus defines a financial
sector to be liberalized if the country has taken 5 out of the 6 aforementioned measures.
6  Empirical Results
We estimate several specifications of the structural investment model in (13). First, we
estimate a simple OLS model with Tobin's q as measure for the marginal profitability of
capital and cash flow-to-capital as measure for the financial factors terms (see Table 9,
Model  1). We find firms to be severely financially constrained over the whole period.
Also, we  find a  strong persistence in  investment, which justifies  our choice  for the
adjustment cost  function.  We  do not  find  evidence for  significant unobserved  firm
specific effects in the simple OLS regression, since we do not find serial correlation in
the error terms. The OLS results may, however, suffer from an endogeneity problem.
We therefore  estimate  model  (13)  in  levels  using  the  aforementioned GMM
techniques (see Table 9, Model 2). We only present two-step GMM estimates, since they
are more efficient than  one-step estimates, and  since  only  the  Sargan test  of  over-
identifying restrictions  is  heteroskedasticity-consistent only  if  based  on  the two-step
estimates. Further details  on the one  and two-step GMM estimators can be  found in
Arellano and Bond (1991). Again, we do not find significant unobserved firrn specific
effects in the GMM level estimation, as indicated by the tests for serial correlation in the
error terms.
The coefficients of the GMM level estimates are quite similar in magnitude to the
OLS estimates, which indicates that there is no strong endogeneity problem. According to
the  GMM  results  there  are  substantial  financial  frictions.  First,  investment  is  not
responsive to changes in Tobin's  q, which indicates that firm's  with better investment
opportunities do not investment more. Second, investment is determined to a large extent
by the internal sources of the firm, as measured by the firm's  cash flow, which indicates
the presence of financing constraints. Third, investment is negatively affected by a firm's
leverage, which indicates that there are informational asymmetries in the debt markets.
The estimated effect of cash flow on the investment of firms is economically important.
All else being equal, a 10 percent decline in cash flow implies a decrease in investment of
around 1.5 percent. Such strong links between investment and cash flow are common in
23the literature. Blundell  et al. (1992) find a similar estimated effect of cash flow on the
investment of UK firms during the period  1975-86, while Gallego and Loayza (2000)
find twice as large estimates for Chilean firms.
Since the GMM level estimation does not show persistent serial correlation in the
residuals it is not necessary to control for potential unobserved firm-specific effects by
estimating the model in first-differences, especially since, as noted earlier, the difference
estimator has some  statistical shortcomings. We nevertheless present the estimates for
model (13) in first-differences (see Table 9, Model 3). The model is supported both by a
test  for  higher-order  serial  correlation  and  by  the  Sargan  test  for  over-identifying
restrictions. This provides  further evidence of the absence of strong unobserved  firm-
specific effects. The coefficients of the model in first-differences have similar order of
magnitude as the coefficients of the model estimated in levels, but some coefficients of
the model in first-differences are less significant. Overall, the results of both models are
similar.
To overcome the statistical problems of the difference estimator we have also used
the system  estimator proposed  by  Arellano  and  Bover  (1995). Use  of this  estimator
results  in  an  improvement  only  if  the  instruments  used  are  uncorrelated  with  the
unobserved  firm-specific  effects. In  generating  the  system  estimator, we  use  weakly
exogenous variables at time t-2, t-3, t-4 as instruments for the equation in first-differences
and differenced variables  at t-1 as instruments for the equation in levels (see Table 9,
Model 4). Although the results of the system estimates are similar to those generated by
the model specified in levels, both the Hausman test and the Difference Sargan test for
the validity of the additional instruments do not  support the use of the GMM system
estimator.  These  results  imply  that  differences  in  the  right-hand  side  variables  are
correlated with the unobserved  firm-specific effects, so that we cannot assume that the
additional moment restrictions used in the system estimation hold. The GMM difference
and system estimates thus supports the statement that our level results do not suffer from
major endogeneity problems or strong unobserved firm specific effects.
Overall, we  find  for the  whole  period  that  companies'  investment  is  not  very
responsive  to  changes  in  q,  and  is  driven  positively  by  the  firm's  cash  flow  and
negatively by  its  level  of  indebtedness. These  findings  indicate that  companies were
24severely  financially  constrained  over  the  whole  period,  but  that  there  were  strong
informational asymmetries in the debt markets.
In a second specification of the investment model we distinguish between small
and  large firms to identify whether investment behavior and finance  constraints differ
between firrns of different  size. Small firms are firms with sales below  the median of
sales in the sample. We have generated both OLS and GMM level estimates (see Table 9,
Model 5 and 6), and do not find major differences between firms of different size during
the whole sample period. Both types of firms appear to be financially constrained over
the period 1988-98 in the sense that investment is highly sensitive to cash  flow. Also,
both  types  of  firms do  not respond  to  changes in Tobin's  q  and  do  not  suffer from
leverage costs. Again, we do not find any evidence for the presence of unobserved firm
specific effects. We therefore do not use the GMM difference or GMM system estimator.
Thirdly, we test whether financial liberalization has changed financing constraints.
For this purpose, we interact the variables  of model (13) with  a dummy variable that
indicates whether the country has  liberalized  its banking sector  or not.  This  dummy
variable is FLIS, which has been defined earlier. We have generated both OLS and GMM
level estimates (see Table 9, Model 7 and  8), and find that, although  firms have been
severely  financially  constrained  over  the  period,  they  have  become  less  financially
constrained as financial liberalization progresses. The estimated effect  is economically
significant.  Financial  liberalization  reduces  the  estimated  effect  of  cash  flow  on
investment from around  15 percent to 3 percent. In other words,  financial liberalization
reduces financing constraints by 80 percent. We also find some evidence that investment
has become less negatively affected by the leverage of firms. All else being equal, a  10
percent increase in leverage implies a decrease in investment of around 1.3 percent before
financial liberalization,  and of only 0.4 percent  after liberalization.  This  suggests that
debt markets have become more perfect in the sense that firms appear to have suffered
less from information asymmetries after financial liberalization than before. Again, we do
not find any evidence for the presence of unobserved firm specific effects.
To identify whether financial liberalization has had a positive impact on firms of all
size we combine the previous model specifications and interact the variables of model
(13) with both size and financial liberalization dummy variables. OLS and GMM level
estimates of this  rich specification again do not  suffer from unobserved  firm specific
25effects (see Table 9, Model 9 and 10). Looking at the coefficients of the multiplicative
terms, we find that financial liberalization has a different impact on firms of different
size. The previous result no longer holds for large firns. Financial liberalization does not
reduce  financing  constraints  for large  firms.  Large  firms  are  moderately  financially
constrained throughout the whole period, in the sense that investment of large firms is
driven only slightly positively by the  firn's  cash flow. On the other hand,  financial
liberalization has been good for small firns. Small firms face severe financing constraints
before financial liberalization, and face financing constraints of the same order as large
firms after financial liberalization. In addition, we find some evidence that the negative
impact of financial leverage on investment reduces for small firms during the process of
financial  liberalization,  and  that  small  firm's  investment  becomes  slightly  more
responsive to changes in q. The reduction for small firrns in the estimated effect of cash
flow  on investment is  economically significant. Before  financial liberalization,  a  10
percent increase in leverage implies a decrease in investment of around 3 percent, all else
being equal. After liberalization, the impact of such an increase on investment reduces to
0.7 percent, the same level as for large firms. In other words,  financial liberalization
reduces financing constraints for small firms by 80 percent.
To summarize, we find (1) strong persistence of investment-to-capital ratios in the
data; (2) financial liberalization has no positive effect on the investment behavior of large
firms; (3) financial liberalization is good for small firms in the sense that it increases the
responsiveness of investment to changes in q, it decreases the dependence on internal
resources, and it reduces informational asymmetries with respect to debt, that is it makes
debt markets more perfect.
Our findings are in line with earlier work that has found that smaller companies are
more likely to suffer from financing constraints (see Schiantarelli (1995)), and are similar
to those of Gelos and Werner (1999) in the case of Mexico who argue that large firms
may have had better access to preferential directed credit before financial liberalization.
This might explain why financial liberalization has had no overall positive effect on large
firms. The positive effect of more efficient financial markets may have been offset for
large  firms  by  the  negative  effect  of  a  decreasing  access  to  preferential  credit.
Alternatively, large firms might  suffer less from informational asymmetries, and thus
have better access to credit in general.
267  Robustness  of Results
As  robustness checks  we  look  at the impact of  a number  of changes to  our model
specification. We only  present OLS estimates for these different model specifications,
since  these  estimates  do  not  suffer  from  major  endogeneity  problems  or  strong
unobserved firm specific effects. First of all, we assess the sensitivity of our results to our
definition of firm size. Instead of using sales to distinguish between small and large firms
we use total assets. We construct a small size dummy variable that takes value one if the
firm has less assets than the median asset size in the sample. Similarly, we construct a
large size dummy variable on the basis of the median of total assets. The OLS estimates
are presented in Table 10 (Model 1). The results are similar to our basic specification that
uses net sales to  distinguish between firms of different size (Table 9, Model 9). Only
small firms benefit from financial liberalization.
Using the median of the sample to distinguish between large and small firms may
not be representative, since our sample consist of listed firms only, and listed firms tend
to be large. Therefore,  we have also used the  1/3 quantile of net sales to distinguish
between  small (below  1/3 quantile) and  large  firms  (above  1/3 quantile). The OLS
estimates are presented in Table 10 (Model 2).  The results are similar, if not stronger, to
our basic results.
Secondly, we assess the sensitivity of our results to the proxy for MPK. Instead of
using Tobin's  q, we use sales-to-capital as proxy for MPK. The results can be found in
Table 10 (Model 3). Again, the results are very similar to our basic specification.
Thirdly, we assess the sensitivity to our definition of when a country has made
substantial progress in liberalizing its financial sector. Instead of requiring 5 measures to
be implemented (FLIS) we define a financial sector to be largely liberalized if 4 measures
have been put into place (FLI4). The estimation results are presented in Table 10 (Model
4). The results are weaker than our basic specification. Although the coefficient estimates
indicate  that  small  firms  gain  from  financial  liberalization,  these  results  are  not
statistically significant at a 10% level. This confirms our view that substantial progress
has to be made (in the sense that most of the measures need to have been implemented)
before financial liberalization becomes effective. Another way to assess the sensitivity to
27our financial liberalization classification is to  look at the components of our financial
liberalization index. Of particular interest is impact of  the reduction of credit control, in
particular the removal of directed credit systems. Of all six measures, this measure is
thought to have the most significant direct impact on the financing constraints of firms,
especially if access to preferential credit differed among different types of finns.  We
therefore construct a dummy variable (CRE) that indicates whether the country has made
substantial progress in  abolishing its directed credit  system, and reduced the adverse
effects of credit control in general. The OLS estimates are presented in Table 10 (Model
5). We find similar, if not stronger, results as with our basic specification. The removal of
directed credit systems has had a positive impact on the financing constraints of small
firms only.
Since our classification of financial liberalization may suffer from the problem to
time liberalization dates we also simply compare financing constraints of firms during the
first half and the second half of our sample period. Since financial liberalization has been
a gradual and progressive process, the two sub-periods are comparable across countries,
in the sense that the financial sectors of all countries in our sample were more liberalized
in the second half than in the first half of the period. If financial liberalization does have a
positive effect  on the  financing constraints of  (some)  firms, we  should  find this by
comparing the two periods, even though the initial level of financial liberalization may
differ across countries, so that the magnitude of the effect may differ across countries.
We split our sample in  the period 1989-94 versus  1995-98. Table 2 shows that most
countries in our sample had made substantial progress with liberalizing their banking
sectors in the year 1994. The OLS estimates of these two additional specifications are
presented in  Table  10 (Model  6). Our basic  results that  use  our  index of  financial
liberalization are confirmed. Small firms became less financially constrained during the
period 1989-98, a period that has been characterized by substantial progress in financial
liberalization in our sample of countries.
8  Conclusions
We have estimated a dynamic investment model using panel data on 394 firms in  13
developing  countries  for  the  years  1988-98. Using  different  specifications  of  the
28investment model we  find that  financial liberalization reduces  the imperfections that
firms  face  when  dealing  with  financial  markets.  Firm's  investment  becomes  less
dependent on  its financial leverage. Furthermore, we  find that  financial liberalization
affects small and large firms differently. Before financial liberalization takes place, small
firms  are found to  be  much more financially constrained than  large  firms. Financial
liberalization then relaxes the extemal financing constraints for small firms, but has little
impact on the financing constraints of large firms. Eventually, the difference between
large and small firms disappears. It seems that only small firms in developing countries
gain from financial liberalization. We hypothesize that in  many developing countries
large firms had access to preferential directed credit during the period before financial
liberalization.  This  form  of  favoritism  is  likely  to  disappear  during  financial
liberalization. In the case of large firms, the efficiency benefits of financial liberalization
thus seem to be offset by the adverse effects of loosing access to preferential credit.
Another explanation is that large firms might suffer less from informational asymmetries,
and thus have better access to credit in general. We also find that countries that have
made substantial progress  in  liberalizing their  financial sector have  shown  dramatic
improvements in their political climate as well. Successful financial liberalization seems
to require both the political will and ability to stop the preferential treatment of well-
connected firms, firms that often tend to be large.
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33Appendix
Table 1  Years of financial liberalization  with respect to six measures
Country  Interest  Entry  Reserve  Credit  Privatization  Prudential
Rates  Barriers  Requirements  Controls  Regulation
Argentina  89  77  93  93  95  94
Brazil  89  91  88  94  97  98
Chile  85  97  80  76  86  86
India  96  93  93  94  no  96
Indonesia  83  88  88  90  92  97
Malaysia  91  94  94  91  no  89
Mexico  89  93  89  91  92  94
Pakistan  95  93  no  95  97  94
Peru  91  96  91  92  95  93
Philippines  85  94  94  83  96  93
Rep. Korea  93  89  96  96  83  92
Taiwan  92  92  no  no  98  97
Thailand  92  95  92  92  no  97
Notes: In Argentina, interest rates were deregulated in 1987, but deregulation was reversed in 1988. In
1989, interest rates were deregulated again. In the above table, No indicates no significant improvement in
this measures of financial liberalization. In Malaysia and Thailand there were no significant reductions in
state ownership of commercial banks during  1988-1997. The major Malaysian conmmercial  banks have
been private since they started operations. Most Thai commercial banks are also privately held, although
one of the largest  banks, Krung Thai Bank is still controlled by the government.
Sources: Various IMF country reports and working papers, various World Bank country reports, working
papers, and discussion papers, various BIS Policy Papers, various Economist Intelligence Unit Country
Reports and Profiles, Caprio et  al. (1994) Chapter 5, Demirguic-Kunt and  Detragiache (1998), Galbis
(1993), Gallego  and Loayza (2000), Lindgren et al. (1996), Williamson and Mahar (1998).
34Table 2  Financial  Liberalization  Index  by year and country
Country  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Argentina  1  2  2  2  2  4  5  6  6  6  6
Brazil  1  2  2  3  3  3  4  4  4  5  6
Chile  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  6  6
India  0  0  0  0  0  2  3  3  S  5  5
Indonesia  3  3  4  4  5  5  5  5  5  6  6
Malaysia  1  2  2  4  4  4  6  6  6  6  6
Mexico  0  2  2  3  4  5  6  6  6  6  6
Pakistan  0  0  0  0  0  1  2  4  4  5  5
Peru  0  0  0  2  3  4  4  5  6  6  6
Philippines  2  2  2  2  2  3  5  5  6  6  6
Rep. Korea  1  2  2  2  3  4  4  4  6  6  6
Taiwan  0  0  0  0  2  2  2  2  2  3  4
Thailand  I  I  1  1  4  4  4  5  5  6  6
Notes: The above figures focus on changes in the degree of financial liberalization within a country. The
figure indicates the number of measures that has been implemented with respect to six different types of
funancial sector liberalization. The index ranges thus from  0-6, with 6 indicating the  highest  level of
financial liberalization. The index is constructed as of year-end status. In our empirical work we use figures
at year-end of period t-l  for the level of financial liberalization at the beginning of period t.
Table 3  Sequence of Financial Liberalization
Country  INT  ENT  RES  CRE  PRI  PRU
Argentina  2  1  3.5  3.5  6  5
Brazil  2  3  1  4  5  6
Chile  3  6  2  1  4.5  4.5
India  4.5  1.5  1.5  3  - 4.5
Indonesia  1  2.5  2.5  4  5  6
Malaysia  3.5  5.5  5.5  3.5  1  2
Mexico  1.5  5  1.5  3  4  6
Pakistan  3.5  1  - 3.5  5  2
Peru  1.5  6  1.5  3  5  4
Philippines  2  4.5  4.5  1  6  3
Rep. Korea  4  2  5.5  5.5  1  3
Taiwan  1.5  1.5  - - 4  3
Thailand  3  5  3  3  1  6
Average  2.5  3.4  2.9  3.2  4.0  4.2
Median  2  3  2.5  3.3  4.8  4.5
Notes: The figures indicate the sequence of financial liberalization with respect to each of the six different
measures, The number 1 therefore indicates that the type of liberalization in question was the first measure
(out of 6) to come into effect. The number 2 indicates the second measure to become effective, et cetera.
Averages are used when measures were imnplemented  in the same year.
35Table 4  Comparison of Financial Liberalization Dates
Country  Largely  Liberalized  Banking  Sector  Stock  Market  Liberalization
FLI  LLI
Argentina  1994  1993  1989.11
Brazil  1997  Not  until 1996  1991.05
Chile  1986  1985  1988.12
India  1996  Not  until 1996  1992.10
Indonesia  1992  1989  1989.09
Malaysia  1994  1992  1988.12
Mexico  1993  1992  1989.05
Pakistan  1997  Not  until 1996  1991.02
Peru  1995  1993  1993.06
Philippines  1994  1994  1989.10
Rep.  Korea  1996  Not until 1996  1992.02
Taiwan  Not until 1998  Not  until 1996  1991.01
Thailand  1995  1992  1988.12
Notes:  FLIS  indicates  liberalization  of bank sector  and is defined  as the year when  FLI hits 5; the "largely
liberalized  financial  system" dates (LLI) are from Williamson and Mahar (1998); the stock market
liberalization  dates  are from IFC.
Table 5  Link between Financial Liberalization and the Political Climate
Country  ICRG  Political  Risk Index  FLI  and  ICRG  Political  Risk  Index
1988  1998  Correlation  Between  1988-98
Argentina  57  76  89%
Brazil  67  66  29%
Chile  56  73  49%
India  45  59  85%
Indonesia  39  42  45%
Malaysia  58  66  77%
Mexico  66  69  16%
Philippines  40  74  90%
Rep.  Korea  64  75  75%
Taiwan  77  82  81%
Thailand  58  70  86%
Average  57  68  66%
Notes:  The ICRG  index ranges  between  0 and 100%,  and  is decreasing  in  the level of political  risk.
Source:  The ICRG  political  risk index is constructed  by Political  Risk Service.  We do not have ICRG  data
on Pakistan  and Peru.
36Table 6  Deletion Criteria
Sample  selection: All  developing  countries  in  the  World Scope  database  (April  1999 CD-Rom and
December 1999 CD-Rom) with at least 20 firms and with at least some firms with at least seven years of
data during 1988-98.  We exclude transition economies.
In addition, we establish the following deletion criteria:
*  Firms that operate in the financial or service industries (primary SIC industry code 6, 7, 8 or 9)
*  All firms with 3 or less years coverage
*  All fims  with depreciation values missing
*  All firms with zero net value of property, equipment and plant (often due to hyperinflation)
*  All firms with Investment/Capital>0.5 (due to acquisitions or revaluation of assets)
*  All firms with Investment/Capital<O.  I (due to divestments)
•  All firms with Sales/Capital<0.  1
*  All firms with Sales/Capital>10 (this excludes sales companies)
*  All firns  with Q<0.2 (due to furms  in distress)
*  All finms  with Q>>1O  (due to start-ups or due to problems to measure capital)
*  All firms with Cashflow/Capital<0.01 (due to negative operating income)
*  All firms with Cashflow/Capital>  1 (due to problems to measure capital)
*  All firms with Debt/Capital>2
*  All firms with Cash/Capital>0.5 (this excludes mostly financial holdings)
These deletion criteria result in a sample of 13 countries.
37Table 7  Variable Definition
MPK,  =  Marginal profitability of capital at the beginning of period t
or Q,
K,
K,  Capital at the beginning of period t22.
Net tangible assets 23 at end of period t-1 minus capital expenditure
during period t-I plus accumulated  depreciation and amortization until
the end of period t-l.
S,  Net sales at the end of period t-1.
I,  =  Investment during period t
=Kt+1  + Deprt - Kt (1  + ;r,  ) .
Deprt  Depreciation during period t
=  5,K 1
,t  =  Inflation over the period t.
Q,  =  Average q at the beginning of period t
tD  +MV 1
K,
D,  =  Book value of long-tern 24 debt at the beginning of period t.
MVt  Market value of equity at the beginning of period t25.
FIN  =  Financial variable related to financing constraint
_  CF,
K,
CF,  Operating cash flow during the period t-1
Operating income during period t-1 plus depreciation during period t-1.
Small,  =  1, if the firm is small in terms of either net sales during the period
period t-1 or total assets at the beginning of period t, and 0 otherwise.
In the base case model, Small, equals 1 if the firm's sales are smaller
than the median sales of firms in the sample.
L  arge,  =  1, if the firm is large, i.e. if Small, is 0, and 0 otherwise.
FLI,  =  Financial Liberalization  Dummy, which takes value one if banking
sector is liberalized at the beginning of period t. In the base case model,
FLI,  equals 1, if the financial liberalization index FLI takes value 5 or
6, and equals 0 otherwise.
22Note that variables at the beginning of period t are estimated by figures at the end of period t- 1.
23 Property, plant and equipment net of depreciation.
24 Maturity over one year.
25  Calculated as number of shares outstanding at the end of period t- I times the market price of one share at
the end of period t-1.
38Table 8  Descriptive  Statistics
a. Panel data structure
Years  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Total
Firms  180  101  43  30  22  11  6  1  394
Observations  540  404  215  180  154  88  54  10  1645
Notes: Number of firms with given number of years data.
b. All firms
I/K  Q  S/K  CF/K  D/K
Mean  0.189  2.443  2.002  0.280  0.341
Median  0.170  1.988  1.534  0.247  0.285
Maximum  0.500  9.999  9.859  0.967  1.83
Minimum  0.010  0.216  0.147  0.012  0.000
Std. Dev.  0.125  1.642  1.621  0.155  0.310
Observations  1645  1645  1645  1645  1645
c. Small firms
I/K  Q  S/K  CF/K  D/K
Mean  0.186  2.620  1.965  0.302  0.291
Median  0.161  2.222  1.494  0.275  0.195
Maximum  0.500  9.243  9.859  0.967  1.599
Minimum  0.010  0.216  0.147  0.013  0.000
Std. Dev.  0.129  1.651  1.568  0.172  0.303
Observations  822  822  822  822  822
Notes: 'Small' is defined as sales being smaller than the median of firm sales in the sample.
d. Large firms
I/K  Q  S/K  CF/K  D/K
Mean  0.192  2.265  2.039  0.258  0.392
Median  0.177  1.766  1.582  0.228  0.345
Maximum  0.495  9.999  9.487  0.932  1.826
Minimum  0.010  0.231  0.217  0.012  0.000
Std. Dev.  0.120  1.614  1.672  0.133  0.309
Observations  823  823  823  823  823
Notes: 'Large' is defined as sales being larger than the median of firm sales in the sample.
e. Correlation  matrix
I/K  Q  S/K  CF/K  D/K
I/K  I
Q  0.126  1
S/K  0.106  0.262  1
CF/K  0.184  0.437  0.610  1
D/K  0.044  -0.033  0.051  -0.011  1
39f. Median statistics by country
Country  Sales  I/K  Q  CF/K  DIK  Obs.
Argentina  885600  0.157  1.417  0.203  0.236  51
Brazil  858049  0.140  0.740  0.167  0.174  30
Chile  167555  0.161  1.977  0.252  0.180  149
India  152012  0.163  2.363  0.288  0.537  300
Indonesia  57130  0.176  1.584  0.310  0.185  55
Malaysia  123013  0.147  2.694  0.242  0.093  335
MexiSo  708980  0.194  2.427  0.217  0.199  99
Pakistan  90356  0.154  1.376  0.379  0.291  17
Peru  114960  0.148  1.440  0.288  0.199  10
Philippines  56288  0.250  2.626  0.219  0.063  32
Rep.  Korea  650390  0.194  1.128  0.220  0.503  249
Taiwan  249028  0.121  2.720  0.211  0.240  114
Thailand  73738  0.177  1.931  0.302  0.191  204
All  198752  0.170  1.988  0.247  0.285  1645
g. Median statistics per industry
Industry  I/K  Q  S/K  CF/K  D/K  Obs.
1  0.144  2.380  0.974  0.288  0.113  26
2  0.146  1.785  0.871  0.203  0.249  54
3  0.208  2.374  0.898  0.201  0.377  26
4  0.175  1.682  0.616  0.211  0.272  161
5  0.218  1.950  2.137  0.239  0.308  148
6  0.153  2.050  2.038  0.254  0.148  185
7  0.190  3.632  2.042  0.500  0.099  12
8  0.154  1.059  1.414  0.221  0.168  70
9  0.192  2.127  3.049  0.363  0.100  44
10  0.108  1.838  0.848  0.189  0.064  36
11  0.135  2.936  2.690  0.419  0.000  8
12  0.158  1.901  1.387  0.242  0.290  63
13  0.163  3.318  1.589  0.368  0.154  20
14  0.157  1.969  1.541  0.279  0.454  201
15  0.187  2.858  3.141  0.275  0.212  45
16  0.114  1.916  2.026  0.218  0.214  38
17  0.120  1.968  4.724  0.301  0.000  9
18  0.171  1.890  1.017  0.223  0.314  139
19  0.123  1.571  1.440  0.209  0.250  106
20  0.168  2.213  1.800  0.302  0.383  36
21  0.277  2.996  2.250  0.278  0.619  30
22  0.217  2.737  2.232  0.376  0.279  72
23  0.181  2.430  2.496  0.268  0.508  85
24  0.276  1.443  1.595  0.251  0.614  10
25  0.170  1.756  1.681  0.302  0.255  21
All  0.170  1.988  1.534  0.247  0.285  1645
40h. Translation of industry codes
Industry  (Primary)  Industry
Code  SIC code  Name
l  0  Agriculture, forestry and fishing
2  1  Mining
3  2  Construction
4  4  Transportation, communication, electric, gas and sanitary services
5  5  Wholesale trade and retail trade
6  20  Food and kindred products
7  21  Tobacco manufactures
8  22  Textile mill products
9  23  Apparel and other finished products made from fabrics and similar materials
10  24  Lumber and wood products, except furniture
11  25  Furniture and fixtures
12  26  Paper and allied products
13  27  Printing, publishing and allied products
14  28  Chemicals and allied products
15  29  Petroleum refining, and related industries
16  30  Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products
1  7  31  Leather and leather products
18  32  Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products
19  33  Primary metal industries
20  34  Fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment
21  35  Machinery, except electrical
22  36  Electrical and electronic machinery, equipment and supplies
23  37  Transportation equipment
24  38  Measuring, analyzing and controlling instruments; photographic, medical and
optical goods; watches and clocks
25  39  Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
Notes: The industry codes follow the classification of the US governnent.  Industry codes can be at 1-digit
levels called SIC codes, or at two-digit levels called Primary SIC (PSIC) codes. PSIC 20-39 indicates the
manufacturing industry at a  two-digit level. The SIC code for the manufacturing sector is 3.  Only the
manufacturing industry codes are at  the two-digit level. We exclude SIC codes 6-9 (which include the
following sectors: finance, insurance and real estate; services; government;  other).
41i. Median statistics  categorized  by Year
Year  Sales  I/K  Q/K  CF/K  DIK  FLI  Obs.
1989  250446  0.237  1.797  0.168  0.168  1  13
1990  500108  0.278  1.705  0.174  0.174  2  36
1991  356645  0.197  2.162  0.163  0.163  2  60
1992  300391  0.173  2,430  0.234  0.234  3  100
1993  170138  0.181  2.073  0.221  0.221  4  165
1994  152150  0.160  2.762  0.264  0.264  4  212
1995  154747  0.186  2.359  0.275  0.275  4  286
1996  187041  0.169  1.852  0.314  0.314  4  321
1997  222373  0.169  1.665  0.313  0.313  5  275
1998  220474  0.117  1.431  0.337  0.337  6  177
All  198752  0.170  1.988  0.285  0.285  4  1645
j.  Distribution  of the financial  liberalization  index in terms of observations
FLI  Number  of Observations  Percentage  of Total  Number  of Observations
0  60  4%
0-1  85  5%
0-2  309  19%
0-3  490  30%
0-4  877  53%
0-5  1268  77%
0-6  1645  100%
42Table 9  OLS and  Two-step GMM estimates of investment model
(i)  ODi  (iii)  (iY)
Variable  OLS-levels  GMM-levels  GMM-FD  GMM-System
Constant  0.1331**  0.1076**  -0.0024  0.1214***
(0.0564)  (0.0469)  (0.0021)  (0.0098)
(1IK),_ 1 0.2009***  0.2389***  0.1609***  0.1850***
(0.0276)  (0.0488)  (0.0318)  (0.0155)
(QIK),  0.0053*  -0.0017  0.0109***  0.01  13***
(0.0029)  (0.0043)  (0.0029)  (0.0023)
(CFIK),  0.1282*  *  0.1551***  0.1961**  0.0973***
(0.0268)  (0.0475)  (0.0907)  (0.0309)
(DIK),  -0.0137  -0.0573***  -0.0220  -0.0823***
(0.0135)  (0.0247)  (0.0422)  (0.0155)
Specification Tests (p-values)
First-order serial correlation:  0.496  0.769  0.000***  0.000***
Second-order serial correlation:  0.651  0.851  0.694  0.747
Wald test ofjoint significance:  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***
Sargan test:  - 0.149  0.299  0.192
Hausman test:  - - - 0.000***
Difference  Sargan test:  - - - 0.000***
Instruments:  - t-2, t-3, t-4  t-2, t-3, t-4  t-2, t-3, t-4
Adjusted R-:  0.14  - - -
Number of observations:  1251  1251  857  1251
Number of frms:  394  394  394  394
Notes:
Dependent variable is (I/YK),.  Model (i)-(ii) include country, industry and year dummies (not reported).
Model (iv) is a system of orthogonal deviations and levels. Model (ii) uses variables at t-2, t-3, t-4 as
instruments. Heteroskedasticity consistent  standard errors are between brackets. Model (iii) uses variables
at t-2, t-3, t-4 as instruments. Model (iv) uses variables at t-2, t-3, t-4 as instruments for the equation in
orthogonal deviations and orthogonal deviations of variables at t- I for the equation in levels. The
realization of the Hausman test statistic  for model (iv) is 54.3, which is %  2  distributed with 4 degrees of
freedom. *** indicates significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates
significance at 10% level.
43Table 9  OLS and Two-step GMM estimates of investment model (continued)
(v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii)
Variable  OLS-levels  GMM-levels  OLS-levels  GMM-levels
Constant  0.1327**  0.1048**  0.1361***  0.1517***
(0.0564)  (0.0543)  (0.0564)  (0.0486)
(IlK),r  0.2015***  0.3304***  0.2013***  0.2303***
(0.0277)  (0.0625)  (0.0277)  (0.0471)
(QIK),  0.0064  0.0051  0.0021  -0.0044
(0.0042)  (0.0081)  (0.0037)  (0.0057)
(CF/K),  0.1376***  0.1631***  0.1716***  0.1565**
(0.0474)  (0.0669)  (0.0356)  (0.0678)
(DIK),  -0.0230  -0.0600  -0.0302  -0.1303***
(0.0169)  (0.0389)  (0.0182)  (0.0255)
Small,  * (QIK),  -0.0022  0.0069
(0.0049)  (0.0117)
Small,  * (CF/K),  -0.0135  -0.0922
(0.0510)  (0.1106)
Small,  * (DIK),  0.0172  0.0081
(0.0222)  (0.0473)
FLI, * (QIK),  - 0.0066  0.0076
(0.0048)  (0.0068)
FLI, * (CFIK),  - -0.0788*  -0.1251*
(0.0419)  (0.0698)
FLI, * (DIK),  - - 0.0290  0.0878***
(0.0213)  (0.0260)
Specification Tests (p-values)
First-order  serial correlation:  0.572  0.106  0.632  0.797
Second-order  serial correlation:  0.639  0.455  0.667  0.996
Wald test of joint significance:  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***
Sargan test:  0.246  - 0.216
Instruments:  - t-3  - t-2, t-3
Adjusted)R 2:  0.14  - 0.14  -
Number of observations:  1251  1251  1251  1251
Number of firms:  394  394  394  394
Notes:
Dependent variable is (IIK),. Small is a dummy variable that takes value one if sales of the firm is smaller
than the median sales in the sample, and zero otherwise. FLI, is a dummy variable that takes value one if
FLI is 5 or 6, and zero otherwise. Model (v)-(viii) include country, industry and year dummies (not
reported). Model (vi) uses variables at t-3 as instruments and assumes that Small is an exogenous variable.
Model (viii) uses variables at t-2, t-3 as instruments  and assumes that FLI, is an exogenous variable (for
interaction  terms only variables at t-2 are used as instruments). Heteroskedasticity  consistent standard
errors are between brackets. *** indicates  significance at 1% level; **  indicates  significance at 5% level; *
indicates  significance at 10% level.
44Table 9  OLS and Two-step GMM estimates of investment  model (continued)
(ix)  (x)
Variable  OLS-levels  GMM-levels
Constant  0.1409***  0.1192**
(0.0563)  (0.0511)
(I/K),,  l0.1985***  0.3178***
(0.0277)  (0.0778)
Large,* Q,  0.0067  0.0037
(0.0051)  (0.0146)
Large,* (CF/K),  0.1170**  0.0730
(0.0551)  (0.1897)
Large,* (DIK),  -0.0338  -0.0470
(0.0222)  (0.0457)
Small,*Q,  -0.0013  -0.0047
(0.0044)  (0.0136)
Small,* (CF/K),  0.2012***  0.3038**
(0.0415)  (0.1464)
Small,* (D/K),  -0.0181  -0.1381*
(0.0267)  (0.0794)
Large,*FLI,*  Q,  0.0021  0.0010
(0.0077)  (0.0145)
Large,* FLI, * (CF/K),  0.0218  0.0413
(0.0778)  (0.1752)
Large,*FLI,* (DIK),  0.0155  0.0196
(0.0276)  (0.0418)
Small, * FLI,  * Q,  0.0095*  0.0113
(0.0060)  (0.0131)
Small,* FLI, * (CF/K),  -0.1250***  -0.2357*
(0.0499)  (0.1344)
Small, * FLI,  * (DIK),  0.0228  0.1340*
(0.0334)  (0.0710)
Specification Tests (p-values)
First-order serial correlation:  0.867  0.186
Second-order serial correlation:  0.691  0.629
Waid test of joint significance:  0.000***  0.000***
Sargan test:  - 0.384
Adjusted R2:  0.14
Instruments  - t-3
Number of observations:  1251  1251
Number of firms:  394  394
Notes:
Dependent variable is (IIK),. Small, is a dummy variable that takes value one if sales of the firm is smaller
than the median sales in the sample, and zero otherwise. Large, is a dummy variable that takes value one if
sales of the firm is larger than or equal to the median sales in the sample, and zero otherwise. FLI, is a
dummy variable that takes value one if FLI is 5 or 6, and zero otherwise. Model (ix) and (x) include
country, industry and year dummies (not reported). Model (x) uses variables at t-3 as instruments and
assumes that FLI, is an exogenous. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are between brackets. *
indicates significance at 1% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 10%
level.
45Table 10  OLS estimates of several specifications  of investment model
(i)  (ii  (iii)
Variable  Size  Size  MPK
Constant  0.1357**  0.1367**  0.1363**
(0.0569)  (0.0575)  (0.0555)
(IIK),-l  0.1959***  0.1952***  0.2026***
(0.0279)  (0.0278)  (0.0281)
Large,* MPK,  0.0057  0.0056  -0.0028
(0.0060)  (0.0047)  (0.0046)
Large,* (CFIK),  0.1333**  0.1369***  0.1823***
(0.0634)  (0.0484)  (0.0532)
Large,* (DIK),  -0.0277  -0.0440**  -0.0298
(0.0267)  (0.0199)  (0.0223)
Small,* MPK,  -0.0004  -0.0006  -0.0022
(0.0037)  (0.0046)  (0.0080)
Small,* (CFIK),  0.1898***  0.1848***  0.1956***
(0.0381)  (0.0440)  (0.0676)
Small, * (DIK),  -0.0330  0.0263  -0.0208
(0.0232)  (0.0316)  (0.0261)
Large,* FLI, *  MPK,  0.0055  0.0028  -0.0030
(0.0082)  (0.0064)  (0.0059)
Large,* FLI,  (CFIK),  0.0105  -0.0175  0.0444
(0.0803)  (0.0563)  (0.0705)
Large,*FLI,* (DIK),  0.0152  0.0351  0.0183
(0.0302)  (0.0233)  (0.0274)
Small,* FLI,* MPK,  0.0069  0.0091  0.0106
(0.0052)  (0.0063)  (0.0095)
Small,* FLI,*  (CFIK),  -0.1006**  -0.1213**  -0.1277*
(0.0474)  (0.0551)  (0.0754)
Small, * FLI, * (DIK),  0.0191  -0.0390  0.0255
(0.0324)  (0.0406)  (0.0332)
Specification Tests  (p-values)
First-order serial correlation-  0.679  0.963  0.778
Second-order  serial correlation:  0.706  0.804  0.708
Wald test of joint significance:  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***
Adjusted R 2:  0.14  0.15  0.14
Number of observations:  1251  1251  1251
Number of furms:  394  394  394
Notes:
Dependent variable is (IIK),. Model (i)-(iii) include country, industry and year dummies (not reported). In
model (i), Small, is a dummy variable that takes value one if assets of the firm is smaller than the median
assets in the sample, and zero otherwise. In model (ii), Small, is a dummy variable that takes value one if
sales of the firm is smaller than the 1/3 quantile of sales in the sample, and zero otherwise. In model (iii)-
(iv), Small, is a dummy variable that takes value one if sales of the firm is smaller than median of sales in
the sample, and zero otherwise. In models (i)-(iii), Large, is a dummy variable that takes value one if Small,
takes value zero, and zero otherwise. In model (iii) MPK, is (SIK), .In the other three models MPK, is
(QIK),  . FLI, is a dummy variable that takes value one if FLI is 5 or 6, and zero otherwise.
Heteroskedasticity  consistent standard errors are between brackets. *** indicates significance at 1% level;
**  indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 10% level.
46Table 10  OLS estimates of several specifications of investment model (continued)
(iv)  (v)  (vi)
Variable  FL14  CRE  Post-94
Constant  0.1258**  0.1261**  0.1204**
(0.0576)  (0.0573)  (0.0581)
(IIK),.,  0.1992***  0.2003***  0.1975***
(0.0276)  (0.0274)  (0.0275)
Large,*  0.0088  0.0094  0.0068
(0.0057)  (0.0051)  (0.0054)
Large,* (CF/IK),  0.1389**  0.1353**  0.1296**
(0.0615)  (0.0615)  (0.0611)
Large,* (DIK),  -0.0263  -0.0426*  0.0064
(0.0273)  (0.0253)  (0.0263)
Small,  *  0.0058  0.0004  -0.0051
(0.0058)  (0.0073)  (0.0052)
Small,* (CF/K),  0.1751***  0.2553***  0.2367***
(0.0503)  (0.0746)  (0.0531)
Small,* (D/K),  -0.0137  -0.0419  0.0124
(0.0369)  (0.0410)  (0.0365)
Large,* FLI, * Q,  -0.0036  -0.0041  0.0004
(0.0076)  (0.0065)  (0.0067)
Large,* FLI, * (CF/K),  0.0012  0.0049  0.0146
(0.0794)  (0.0740)  (0.0816)
Large,* FLI, * (DIK),  0.0053  0.0266  -0.0435
(0.0298)  (0.0289)  (0.0292)
Small,*FLI,*Q,  -0.0016  0.0048  0.0131**
(0.0070)  (0.0080)  (0.0060)
Small,* FLI,* (CF/K),  -0.0655  -0.1490*  -0.1468**
(0.0575)  (0.0797)  (0.0604)
Small, * FLI,  * (DIK),  0.0073  0.0404  -0.0253
(0.0417)  (0.0441)  (0.0398)
Specifzcation Tests (p-values)
First-order serial correlation:  0.714  0.999  0.990
Second-order serial correlation:  0.715  0.704  0.684
Wald test of joint significance:  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***
Adjusted R 2:  0.14  0.14  0.14
Number of observations:  1251  1251  1251
Number of firms:  394  394  394
Notes:
Dependent variable is (I/K),. Model (iv)-(vi) include country, industry and year dummies (not reported).
Small, is a dummy variable that takes value one if sales of the furm is smaller than the median sales in the
sample, and zero otherwise. Large, is a dummy variable that takes value one if Small, takes value zero, and
zero otherwise. In model (iv) FLI, is a dummy variable that takes value one if FLI is 4, 5 or 6, and zero
otherwise. In model (v) FLI, is a dunmmy  variable that takes value one if CRE is 1, and zero otherwise. In
model (vi) FLI, is a dummy variable that takes value one if year is 1995-1998,  and zero otherwise.
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are between brackets. *  * * indicates significance at 1% level;
**  indicates significance at 5% level; * indicates significance at 10% level.
47Annex 1  Major Events of Liberalization of the Banking  Sector for Various Countries
Major  events  related  to: (1) Interest  rates;  (2)  Entry  barriers;  (3) Reserve  requirements;  (4) Credit  Controls;
(5)  Privatization;  (6) Prudential  regulation.
Argentina
1. Elimination  of all interest  rate controls  in 1989  (EIU).
2. Removal  of most entry  barriers  and  branching  restrictions  in 1977  (Lindgren  et al. 1996).
3. Reserve  requirements  lowered  in 1993  (Galbis,  1993).
4. Credit  controls  were  substantially  reduced  in 1993.
5. Start  to privatize  banks  in 1995  (Lindgren  et al. 1996).
6. Central  Bank  starts  to enforce  Basle  capital  adequacy  standards  in 1994  (Galbis,  1993).
Brazil
1. Deposit  rates  are fully  liberalized  in 1989.
2. Entry  barriers  are reduced  after 1991.
3. Reserve  requirements  are rationalized  after 1988.
4. Start  to reduce  directed  credit  especially  to agricultural  sector  in 1994  (IMF).
5. Begin  of privatization  of state-owned  banks  in 1997  (IMF).
6. Central  Bank  modernizes  its supervision  practices  in December  1997  (IMF).
Chile
1. Controls  on interest  rates are elimninated  in 1985  (Gallego  and  Loayza,  2000)
2. Banks  are allowed  to expand  abroad  and  to enter  new business  areas  at home since  1997  (EIU).
3. Reserve  requirements  on both demand  and  time  deposits  are reduced  in 1980  (Bandiera  et al., 2000).
4. Directed  credit  and credit  ceilings  are definitely  abandoned  in 1976  (Bandiera  et al., 2000).
5. Banks  are re-privatized  in 1986  (Bandiera  et al., 2000).
6. Revision  of banking  law  to strengthen  the supervisory  system  in 1986  (Bandiera  et al., 2000).
India
1. Most  interest  rates  deregulated  during  1995-96,  except  those  on deposits  of less  than one year and  on
small  commercial  bank loans (IMF).
2. Entry  restrictions  for banks  eased  in 1993.
3. After 1992,  reserve  requirements  were reduced  in stages  (World  Bank).
4. Priority  credit  scheme  made  more  flexible  for banks  in 1994  (IMF).
5. No major  reduction  yet in governnent  ownership  of public  banks  (World  Bank).
6. New  prudential  norms  in line  with  Basle  Accord  become  operational  in 1996  (World  Bank).
Indonesia
1. Most  deposit  and  loan rates  freed  in 1983.
2. Monopoly  of state  banks  over deposits  of state enterprises  removed  in 1988.  Entry of new banks  is
allowed  (Bandiera  et al., 2000).  Activities  of financial  institutions  broadened  in 1988.  Foreign  banks
allowed  to establish  joint ventures  in 1988.
3. Reserve  requirements  drastically  lowered  in 1988  (Bandiera  et al., 2000).
4. New  reform  package  announced  in 1990  which  took  on the directed  credit  program;  Most  of the liquidity
credit  arrangements  for priority  loans  are eliminated  in 1990  (World  Bank).
5. Reduction  of govemment  ownership  of state  banks  (World  Bank).
6. Improved  bank supervisory  legislation  in 1997  including  new loan classification  and loan  loss
provisioning  rules  (World  Bank).
Malaysia
1. Interest  rate controls  completely  eliminated  in 1991.
2. A two-tier  banking  framework  was introduced  for commercial  banks in December  1994  (IMF).
3. Reserve  requirements  were reduced  in 1994  (World  Bank).
4. The  number  of priority  sectors  and the required  loan  amount  is reduced  in 1991  (Bandiera  et al., 2000).
5. There  have  been no privatizations  of banks.  Most  large  banks  have  been  private  since  they started
operations.  Government,  however,  is majority  shareholder  in two  largest  banks  (World  Bank).
486. New regulation  extends and strengthens Central Bank's supervisory powers (Bandiera et al., 2000).
Mexico
1. Deposit rates liberalized in 1988-89.  Loan rates liberalized after 1988,  except at development banks.
2. New entry of banks permitted in 1991.
3. Reduction of reserve requirements in 1988-89 (IMF and Bandiera et al., 2000).
4. Abolition of directed lending to preferential sectors in 1989 (IMF). Elimination of the liquidity
coefficient requiring that 30% of deposits be invested in T-bills in 1991 (Bandiera et al., 2000).
5. Authorities nationalized 18 commercial banks in 1982.  Nationalized banks re-privatized in 1991-1992.
6. The Central Bank became autonomous in April 1994 (ElU).
Pakistan
1. Most lending rates freed in 1995.
2. Eleven new private banks, including three foreign, established since 1991.
3. No significant reductions in reserve requirements (World Bank).
4. The credit-deposit ratio mechanism, which required banks to keep their credit to the private sector within
limits related to their deposits base, was abolished in 1995 (IMF).
5. Muslim Commercial Bank privatized in 1991.  Allied bank privatized in stages between  1991-93.  First
Women Bank privatized in 1997. Comprehensive  reforms in 1997 reduced government interference in
public-sector banks.
6. Steps were taking during 1993-94 to increase the autonomy of the Central Bank (IMF); Coverage of
bank  supervision increased in 1994 (IMF).
Peru
1. Interest rate controls abolished in 1991.
2. In December 1996,  entry requirements were eased (IMF).
3. Reserve requirements on domestic deposits reduced from 1991  onwards.
4. Subsidized lending eliminated in 1992.
5. All seven public commercial banks liquidated or divested over 1991-95.
6. In 1993, the banking law was modified to strengthen  prudential regulations that apply to banks (IMF).
Philippines
1. Interest rate controls mostly phased out over 1981-85.
2. Restrictions on the entry and operation of banks were eased in 1994 (IMF); Restrictions on foreign bank
branching were lifted in 1994 (IMF); Foreign banks were allowed to purchase up to 60 percent of the
equity of local banks in 1994 (IMF).
3. Reserve requirements lowered in 1993.
4. Directed credit partly abolished in 1983.
5. Government reduced stake in PNB to 47% in December 1995.
6. In December 1993, Central Bank was restructured and re-capitalized (IMF).
Rep. Korea
I. In 1993,  deregulation of interest rates on deposits with maturities of two years and on most loans (IMF).
2. Entry barriers are lowered in again in 1989.  The establishment of new financial institutions is approved
in 1989 (Bandiera et al., 2000).
3. Reserve requirements lowered in 1996 (IMF)
4. Most policy-based lending phased out in 1996; In 1996, the Central Bank removed the restriction on the
premium a bank could charge over its prime lending rate, and revised its rules for credit control (IMF).
5. Commercial banks were privatized during 1981-83 (IMF).
6. General Banking Act of 1991 introduces new prudential measures and imposes supervisory regulations
(Bandiera et al., 2000); In 1992, measures were introduced to increase transparency of regulations and
procedures on bank supervision (IMF).
Taiwan
1. Interest rates nominally liberalized in 1989, but prices remained uncompetitive until new banks were
established in 1992.
492. Deregulation on the entry of new private commercial banks in 1991-92. Establishment of 16 new banks
in 1992 (EIU).
3. Directed credit still prevalent. Budgets for subsidized credit continually modified in recent years.
4. No significant reductions in reserve requirements (World Bank).
5. In January 1998, three of the largest commercial banks are partly privatized (EIU).
6. In May 1997,  the Central Bank of China (Taiwan) Act was amended to improve bank regulation (IMF).
Thailand
1. Interest-rate ceilings on all types of deposits abolished in 1990.  Ceiling on loan rates removed in 1992.
2. Since September 1994, commercial banks re allowed to invest in any business (World Bank); Finance
and securities companies permitted to set up banks outside Bangkok with approval in 1995.
3. Reduction of reserve requirements in 1992 (IMF).
4. Government  gradually eliminated directed credit after 1980. The ceiling on commercial bank loans was
lifted in 1992.  Commercial banks and finance companies were permitted to issues certificates of deposits in
1992.  Relaxation of rnral credit requirement in 1992 (IMF).
5. No privatization efforts. Most large Thai commercial banks are private, but one of the largest banks,
Krung Thai bank, is still public (World Bank).
6. In 1997,  banking law was amended to strengthen prudential regulations (IMF).
Notes:
Unless otherwise  noted, the source of information is: Williamson, J. and M. Mahar (1998). IMF indicates
IMF Country Reports, and World Bank indicates World Bank Country Reports.
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